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19981 SURVEY SECTION
Products Liability. Fry v. Allergan Medical Optics, 695 A.2d 511
(R.I. 1997). Where a plaintiff suffers an injury from a Class III
medical device regulated by the Medical Devise Amendments to
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (MDA), recovery under
theories of negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty are
preempted because they impose additional requirements on the
manufacturer.' As these additional requirements impose different
or additional duties on the manufacturer in the form of a court
judgment, they are in conflict with the MDA.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In March of 1990, Arthur Fry (Fry) underwent eye surgery at
Kent County Memorial Hospital. 2 Fry was a seventy-two-year-old
veteran with a history of recurring eye problems.3 His surgery was
precipitated by a cataract that had formed in his left eye and im-
paired his vision.4 To correct this condition, plaintiffs ophthalmol-
ogist removed the natural lens from Fry's eye and replaced it with
an AC-21B Anterior Chamber Intraocular Lens (Lens) manufac-
tured by Allergan Medical Optics (Allergan).5 The Lens was cre-
ated to "rest behind the eye's pupil and iris" and to replace Fry's
damaged natural lens.6
The performance of the Lens was less than satisfactory. 7 The
Lens "became dislocated twice, was repositioned surgically and ul-
1. The MDA provide in part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue to effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to he device under this
chapter.
Medical Device Amendments to Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 521(a), 21
U.S.C.A. § 360k(a) (West Supp. 1997).
2. See Fry v. Allergan Med. Optics, 695 A.2d 511, 512 (R.I. 1997).
3. See id. (stating that Mr. Fry's chronic condition included "a detached ret-
ina, glaucoma and cataracts").
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
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timately had to be removed."s Because of problems attributed to
the dislocation and the removal of the Lens, Fry contended that he
endured chronic eye pain and acquired a loss of vision.9 In April of
1993, Fry brought suit in Rhode Island Superior Court. He named
as defendants eight medical-device manufacturers. 10 He sought
damages based on claims of negligence, strict liability and breach
of express and implied warranties." Mr. Fry was later allowed to
amend his compliant to name the defendant, Allergan, because it
was later discovered that none of the originally named defendants
manufactured the Lens. Allergan filed a motion for summary judg-
ment. The superior court granted the motion stating that the MDA
preempted state-law claims against the manufacturer of a Class
III medical device. 12
BACKGROUND
The MDA were codified in 1976.13 As amendments to the Fed-
eral Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, they were initiated by Congress
primarily out of concern for the safety of medical devices. 14 The
MDA grants jurisdiction over medical devices to the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA).1 5 The MDA creates three classifica-
tions of medical devices based on risk.16 The type of devise used on
Fry was a Class III devise which required extensive testing and
licencing by the FDA. 17 Since the FDA's controls regarding the
Class III devises cannot by themselves ensure their safe use or
safety, the FDA requires the devise to undergo "premarket ap-
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Medical Device Amendments to Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
§ 521(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 360K(a) (West Supp 1997).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. ("Class I devices, which include tongue depressors and ice bags,
consist of posing the lowest level of risk and are subject only to 'general controls.'
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A). Class II devices, which include hearing aids and syringes
are moderately regulated through 'special controls.' 21 U.S.C. § 360 (a)(1)(B). Class
II devices, however, like class I devices, may be marketed without advance ap-
proval by the FDA .... Class III medical devices consist of those devices that are
important for sustaining human life and well-being but which may, notwithstand-
ing, present a potentially unreasonable risk of illness or injury.").
17. See Fry, 695 A.2d at 513.
SURVEY SECTION
proval." i s This process consists of an involved review process con-
ducted by the FDA of the "ingredients, components,
manufacturing methods and proposed labeling of the medical
devise."19
The FDA takes approximately 1200 hours to review each ap-
plication for premarket approval. 20 However, the FDA still retains
the right to withdraw the product from the market following the
pre-market approval process. 21 Furthermore, any additional
changes made to the product in its labeling or manufacturing that
might affect the safety or quality of the devise must have prior
FDA approval. 22
Congress created two exemptions from the premarket ap-
proval scheme. 23 Devises prior to 1976 that were already in the
stream of commerce were grandfathered, and devises that were
substantially similar to grandfathered devises were granted ap-
proval.24 The lens used by Fry was a Class III devise submitted for
approval on July 3, 1987 and was granted approval on September
29, 1989.25 Consequently, the lens did not fall within either of the
above two exceptions.
ANALYSIS
The appeal in this case centers around the extent to which the
MDA preempts the plaintiffs state-law claims. 26 As part of the
FDA regulatory program, the MDA falls under the guise of federal
preemption. 27 The supremacy clause is illustrative of Congress's
plenary power to legislate in this arena. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court rationalized its interpretation of the supreme
power of the federal government by stating that "if Congress in-
18. Fry, 695 A.2d at 513; see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 360e(a) (West Supp. 1997).
19. Fry, 695 A.2d at 513; see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 360e(c)(1)(A)-(G) (West Supp.
1997).
20. See Fry, 695 A.2d at 513.
21. See id.; see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 360e(e)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1997).
22. Fry, 695 A.2d at 513; see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 360e(e)(1)(B), (E) (West Supp.
1997); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(a) (1997).
23. See Fry, 695 A.2d at 513.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 514.
27. See U.S. Const. art. VI, c. 2.
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tends, state laws may be preempted by federal law and will be con-
sidered to be 'without effect.'" 28
Allergan relied specifically on the express language in the stat-
ute to assert that the plaintiff's claims were preempted. 29 In estab-
lishing this theory, the defendant claimed that allowing a state-
law claim would add requirements that would be "different from,
or in addition to" the premarket-approval process.30 The plaintiff
claimed that Congress did not intend for the premarket approval
process or judgments rendered on state-law claims to be require-
ments under the language established in 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)a. 31
Therefore, the interpretation of the word "requirement" was di-
rectly related to the success of the plaintiff's claim.32
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that a state-law claim
is preempted when the party bringing suit does not base the claim
on the failure of the manufacturer to comply with requirements
imposed by the FDA under the MDA.33 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court found that bringing suit against a medical-devise
manufacturer would require the plaintiff to show that the defend-
ant failed to follow federally prescribed guidelines. 34 Absent a
manifest relationship between the complaint and requirements
promulgated by the MDA, allowing the plaintiff's action to proceed
would have the net effect of adding procedure to the MDA.35
The court reasoned that sanctioning additional procedures
would augment federal law, which is prohibited by the supremacy
clause.36 As the plaintiff was not asserting any specific failure of
the manufacturer to comply with requirements set forth by the
MDA, his claim was prohibited. 37
28. Fry, 695 A.2d at 514 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)); see also
Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 381 A.2d 1358, 1361 (R.I. 1977).
29. See Fry, 695 A.2d at 514; see also supra note 2.
30. Fry, 695 A.2d at 514.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 517.
34, See id.; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2257 (1996) (estab-
lishing the preemption rule by holding that Congress intended preemption "only
where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal
interest").
35. See Fry, 695 A.2d at 517.
36. See id.
37. See id. (stating that the plaintiff sought recovery under theories of negli-
gence, strict liability and breach of warranty).
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CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs claims of negligence, strict liability and breach
of warranty were based on theories not related to the manufac-
turer's failure to comply with the approval process set forth by the
MDA and are therefore preempted by federal law. The premarket-
approval process is a specific federal interest, and the process es-
tablishes strict federal requirements on manufacturers of medical
devices. The FDA is the proper entity to address enforcement
issues.
Allowing the plaintiffs action would effectively allow state
courts to supplement the procedural requirements of the MDA
with alternative regulatory schemes, albeit judicial in form. As
this new "requirement" would be arbitrarily promulgated by a
state court against a federal agency, it is constitutionally untena-
ble.38 Had the plaintiff claimed that the procedures set forth by
the MDA were somehow circumvented by Allergan, the plaintiff
would not have been preempted by federal law.
William J. Powers, IV
38. Fry, 695 A.2d at 514 (referring to Article VI, clause 2 of the United States
Constitution).
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